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This article analyses the systems of worker participation in
company profits or operating results applied in Latin America
and their capacity to meet the needs of the economic context in
which companies operate. After an introduction (section I), a
brief outline of variable wage systems is presented and the main
features of the participation systems used in four Latin Ameri-
can countries (Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) are de-
scribed (section II). The characteristics of these systems are then
compared with each other and with those of the system adopted
in Brazil since 1994 (section III). The application of these forms
of participation is then evaluated, and information on the Mexi-
can profit sharing system is presented to this end (section IV).
On the basis of still rather fragmentary information, some as-
pects which seem important for making a preliminary evalua-
tion of the Brazilian system are then discussed (section V). By
way of conclusion, the desirability of applying such participa-
tion instruments in the new economic and labour context is ana-
lysed (section VI).
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I
Introduction
Most of the Latin American countries which have
legislation on financial participation by workers in
their companies have systems of sharing in the prof-
its (sometimes called gains, earnings or other terms).
In principle, profit-sharing programmes consist of
additional payments made to workers as a function
of the achievement of a certain level of profits by
their firms. Generally speaking, in these countries
such systems were introduced through compulsory
legislation laying down the percentage of
profit-sharing, the definition of profits to be used, the
workers included in and excluded from the system,
and sometimes also the way in which the amount
thus established should be shared out among the
workers. It is therefore essentially a variable pay-
ment seeking to link a part of workers’ total remu-
neration to the success of their companies, as
measured by their profits.
Originally, at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, profit-sharing systems were implemented on a
voluntary basis by companies which wanted to estab-
lish good labour relations and to share part of the
fruits of their success with their workers (Perry and
Kegley, 1990). A modest redistributive intention un-
derlay this attitude. Later on, some countries decided
to make this principle obligatory, extending these
benefits to most workers. In a context of full employ-
ment and sustained growth, this distributive policy
seemed in line with the economic and labour context.
In recent years, however, the situation has un-
doubtedly undergone substantial changes. The labour
market is no longer marked by indefinite contractual
relationships, but rather the rapid growth of more
precarious forms of employment, and companies
seem to have entered on a process of endless restruc-
turing because of the need to maintain their competi-
tiveness, now at international levels. We may
therefore wonder if, in this new context, workers’
profit-sharing continues to be a suitable instrument
in the form in which it was originally formulated.
This mechanism is no novelty in the region.
Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, among other
countries, have various forms of legislation regulat-
ing such profit-sharing, with a common basic origi-
nal objective: to express the right of workers to share
in the financial results of their companies, with an
obvious redistributive intention.
Departing from this predominant Latin Ameri-
can approach, Brazil has recently taken a different at-
titude to worker participation. Provisional Measure
No. 794, introduced late in 1994, provides for shar-
ing by workers in the profits or results of their com-
panies.1 This Provisional Measure regulates for the
first time a Constitutional provision which has ex-
isted since 1946 and has been ratified in successive
Brazilian Constitutions. Its terms are quite flexible:
the social actors can lay down the criteria for
profit-sharing through negotiation and can choose
between systems linked to the company’s profits, to
specific results, or to mixed indicators. Since this le-
gal instrument has now been in force for over three
years, some experience has been built up in its appli-
cation which could be useful for evaluating the vir-
tues of this new approach.
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 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the tri-
partite seminar on “Experiences in workers’ profit-sharing”,
held in São Paulo in August 1997. The views expressed in this
article are the exclusive responsibility of the author and their
publication does not necessarily mean that they are authorized
by the ILO.
1 According to the Brazilian Constitution, in important and ur-
gent cases the President of the Republic can adopt provisional
measures which have the status of laws, but must submit them
immediately to the National Congress for approval. The mea-
sures remain valid for thirty days, and if not converted into laws
they lose their validity. In order to prevent this from happening,
Provisional Measures may be reissued with a new number, as
has occurred in the case of the measure in question so far.
II
Variable remuneration systems
Although worker participation in profits or operating
results may be considered as forming part of variable
remuneration systems, in addition to differences in
the way they are implemented they have quite differ-
ent potential and objectives, which should be clari-
fied at this point.
Profit-sharing systems with payment in money
(like all those of the Latin American countries) are
fundamentally income distribution systems which, at
best, increase a worker’s identification with his firm
to some extent.2 In most cases, however, they merely
represent an “extra cost” (although of a variable na-
ture) in the production process. The fact that the cost
is variable does, of course, represent an advantage
over other labour costs, since at times of crisis, when
the company’s profits fall, this component adjusts it-
self downward automatically.
This flexibility of labour costs forms the main
theoretical argument in Martin Weitzman’s proposal.
In his view, linking a significant part of total remu-
neration to company profits can lead to increased
employment and a reduction in the inflationary pres-
sures exerted by wages (Weitzman, 1984). As re-
gards employment, linking a substantial part of
remuneration to the financial performance of compa-
nies can stimulate new recruitment, as it reduces both
business risks and the cost of the newly hired staff
who will share in the total amount of profits fixed in
advance. As regards inflation, linking part of wage
increases to profits restricts the wage component of
inflation.
Systems of worker participation in the com-
pany’s operating results, however, can generate or
stimulate changes in workers’ behaviour and their
use of the factors of production, with possible bene-
fits for both the company and themselves. Through
conversations between the management and the
workers, measurable targets are fixed for variables
which are under the control of the latter, together
with a scale of rewards for their achievement. In or-
der to increase the degree of motivation, the corre-
sponding payments should be made as often as
possible, so as to relate them clearly with improve-
ments in performance. Programmes of this type can
be aimed at stimulating individual effort (raising pro-
ductivity in the strict sense), improving product qual-
ity, saving on resource use, reducing waste and lost
time, reducing accidents, etc., or even promoting
more than one of these aspects at the same time.
The feature of profit-sharing systems which fits
in best with the present economic context is the fact
that they are variable. Payments in respect of
profit-sharing form part of workers’ total remunera-
tion, but unlike their basic wage or other benefits
which are paid on a regular basis (“thirteenth
month”, holidays) or which depend on their individ-
ual characteristics (family allowances, seniority),
these payments are only made if the profits effec-
tively materialize. Otherwise, no payment whatever
is made in this respect. Consequently, this variable
component of total remuneration is an instrument
which automatically adjusts labour costs and can
give the company greater flexibility for dealing with
fluctuations in demand for its products and help to
obviate unnecessary dismissals of staff.3
Various studies have sought to determine the
relation between profit-sharing and productivity. A
review of the literature on this matter came to
the conclusion that there is a positive albeit moderate
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2 We will not deal here with deferred-payment participation
systems, which can have a positive impact on the rate of domes-
tic saving. The fact that wage levels are mostly very low in the
countries studied would make their application extremely diffi-
cult, however.
3 The existence of a variable, automatically adjusting compo-
nent may not be enough in the event of an acute crisis, how-
ever. In the Argentine motor industry, for example, more
drastic measures had to be taken after the 1997 Asian crisis,
even though a significant part of the workers’ remunerations
were of a variable nature. Thus, in addition to the cost cuts
brought about by the automatic adjustment mechanism, over-
time was reduced, there were suspensions and cuts in working
hours, and programmes of accelerated voluntary retirement and
outright dismissals were applied (Soifer and Tomada, 1999).
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relation (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990), but Card
(1990) found that the effect of profit-sharing on
productivity would occur at the time of initiation of
the programmes, so that it would be a non-repetitive
effect.
At all events, worker participation in company
profits does not seem to affect their motivation sig-
nificantly. This would limit the usefulness of this in-
strument at times when organizational restructuring
processes in firms need the collaboration and active
participation of the workers. In this sense, worker
participation in the operating results would appear to
be a more suitable instrument, since in this case the
variable payment is linked to the achievement of spe-
cific goals which are of interest to the firm and
which have been previously agreed between manage-
ment and workers. Furthermore, in a context of
growing competitiveness, participation in the operat-
ing results is not limited to the mere reduction of la-
bour costs but also seeks to improve the firm’s
position by making the workers participants in the
formulation and implementation of the necessary
changes.
Unlike profit-sharing, participation in the operat-
ing results cannot be decided at the central level,
since it is only at the enterprise level that the most
suitable approaches to its situation can be deter-
mined. Consequently, the authorities can only inter-
vene indirectly by promoting the adoption of such
programmes through, for example, fiscal incentives,
or exempting them from some social security pay-
ments.
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Box 1
MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROFIT SHARING AND PARTICIPATION IN OPERATING RESULTS
Profit sharing Participation in operating results
Objective. To link remuneration to the success of the en-
terprise.
To promote identification of workers with the
objectives of the firm (to increase profits).
May be designed to:
Encourage individual effort.
Improve product quality.
Save on use of resources.
Stimulate cooperation and teamwork.
Factor remunerated. Profits. Productivity (measured in terms of one or
more indicators).
Unit remunerated. The company as a whole, or particular pro-
duction units.
Individuals or work groups.
Frequency of remuneration. Yearly or twice-yearly. Monthly, quarterly or twice-yearly.
Availability of rewards. Immediate (paid in cash, without additional
social security benefits for the worker).
Deferred (deferred payment, with additional
social security benefits for the worker).
Immediate (paid in cash, without additional
social security benefits for the worker).
Main advantages. In periods when the company makes a profit,
part of the latter is received by the workers. In
periods of recession, labour costs are reduced
automatically, thus easing the adjustment pro-
cess.
Workers have more influence and control over
the results than in the case of profit-sharing
schemes.
Main disadvantages. Some important factors are not under the con-
trol of the workers (such as management deci-
sions or macroeconomic factors).
It is sometimes difficult to determine and
measure the most suitable indicators.
Efforts must be made to prevent the incentives
from having undesirable effects on other as-
pects.
Source: Marinakis (1997).
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III
The profit-sharing systems of some
Latin American countries as compared
with the Brazilian system
As already noted, a number of Latin American coun-
tries have legislation laying down the forms of par-
ticipation by workers in their companies’ profits. The
systems are different in various aspects, so that their
effects are also different.
In Mexico, the profit-sharing system takes as its
base the taxable income of enterprises, 10% of which
must be shared out among the workers under this
concept.4 It is important to note that companies can
not deduct losses from previous years in determining
the profits to be shared among the workers. Since
1988 there has been a discrepancy between the base
for determination of the workers’ share in the profits
and the base used for calculating income tax, be-
cause of an adjustment for inflation which was ap-
plied only in the latter case. Because of this
difference, the effective share of the workers is
smaller than originally provided for in the legisla-
tion.
The form of distribution is also laid down in the
law. Half of the profits to be shared out among the
workers are distributed according to the wages of
each worker (the idea being to provide incentives for
the higher-paid staff), while the other half are shared
out equally among all the workers in identical
amounts (the aim being to redistribute income, as in
relative terms these amounts are more important to
the lower-paid workers). Among the types of compa-
nies exempted from applying such profit-sharing are
new companies, during their first year of operation;
new companies in the mining sector during the pe-
riod of prospection; non-profit-making companies,
and companies with a turnover of less than 6 million
pesos per year.
In Chile the “liquid profits” are used as the base
for determining the workers’ share in the profits.5
The “liquid profits” are the result of deducting 10%
from the amount subject to income tax (without
deduction of losses from previous years) for “remu-
neration of the employer’s own capital”. Only com-
panies which are obliged by law to present their
statements of accounts are subject to this system.
Although the legislation stipulates that 30% of
these profits must be distributed among the workers,
the Chilean Labour Code opens up an alternative
which frees companies from the foregoing require-
ment: the possibility of paying workers a proportion
of their annual wages (25%), with a ceiling of 4.75
Official Minimum Wages per worker. This alterna-
tive permits highly profitable companies to keep the
amount distributed under profit-sharing down to
quite a low maximum level: workers with wages over
1.60 Official Minimum Wages would receive less
than 25% of their annual wages. The workers’ shares
are proportional to their wages.
In practice, the predominant form of
profit-sharing is this system based on a proportion of
the workers’ annual wages, subject to a ceiling. Ac-
cording to one survey, this system is used in 76% of
all cases, while that involving the payment of 30% of
profits is used in only 10% of the firms (Espinosa
and Damianovic, 1999).
The Peruvian legislation on profit-sharing differs
from that of Mexico and Chile in that losses from
previous years can be deducted,6 and it also lays
down different percentage shares according to the
type of activity of the firms. Thus, in mining compa-
nies, commercial establishments and restaurants the
workers’ share is 8% of the profits; in fisheries, man-
ufacturing companies and telecommunications it is
10%, and in all other companies it is 5%. In Peru,
too, there is a ceiling on profit-sharing, but it is quite
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4 Mexico, Ley Federal del Trabajo, Título 3º, chap. VIII, articles
117-131.
5 Chile, Código del Trabajo, chap. V: Remuneration. 6 Peru, Gobierno (1996).
high (18 monthly wages). As in Mexico, 50% of the
total is shared out among all the workers in equal
amounts, while the remaining 50% is distributed in
accordance with each worker’s wage. Cooperatives,
non-profit-making institutions and firms with 20 or
fewer workers are exempt from this legislation.
Unlike the other countries mentioned here, the
profit-sharing system applied in Venezuela has both a
floor level and a ceiling.7 The floor or minimum
level, which is equivalent to 15 days’ wages, is appli-
cable to all firms, including non-profit-making insti-
tutions and firms which are exempted from giving
workers a share in the profits (although this may
sound like a contradiction in terms). At the other ex-
treme, there is a ceiling level differentiated according
to whether the company has 50 workers or more (in
which case it is four months’ wages) or less than 50
(two months’ wages).
In this case, profit-sharing –which is a concept
that ought to mean variable payments– becomes in
practice merely a further fixed cost whose value de-
pends on the sector in which the company operates.
The explicit introduction of floor and ceiling levels
has undoubtedly contributed to this result. Further-
more, the size of these payments is quite significant,
since although the floor level represents only 4.16%
of the annual wage, the ceiling level is equivalent to
16.7% for firms with fewer than 50 workers and 33%
for those with over 50.
Among the Latin American profit-sharing sys-
tems (figure 1), that of Mexico seems to be the “pur-
est”, as the payments made under this system vary
according to the company’s profits. In the case of
Chile, the establishment of a ceiling level is designed
to restrict workers’ shares in the profits in companies
and sectors where the rate of profit is very high (this
is not so clear in the case of Peru, where the ceiling
seems quite high). Instead of limiting the workers’
share in these sectors by fixing a lower percentage
rate, it was preferred in Chile to limit it to a certain
number of official minimum wages. At the other ex-
treme, Venezuela’s establishment of floor and ceiling
levels represents the distortion of an instrument
which should be linked to the company’s actual prof-
its: the inherent features of the legislation mean
that it is applied as though it were just another fixed
payment whose size depends (within the set ranges)
on the company’s general capacity to pay but which
is generally speaking not variable.
Though the system of worker participation in
profits is applied all over Latin America, and almost
all the countries studied have companies, especially
in the modern sector, that have systems of worker
participation in the operating results,8 Brazil is the
only country in the region where the legislation of-
fers the possibility of choosing between these two
systems, which enjoy the same incentives in terms of
exemptions from employers’ contributions.
If we compare the Brazilian system with the
other Latin American systems, we see first of all that
the Brazilian system is not linked only to profits, as it
is possible to choose a system of participation linked
to operating results. Although the degree of partici-
pation in profits can be regulated (generally by fixing
percentages), participation in the operating results
cannot be regulated by the central authorities, as it is
eminently within the domain of the companies (al-
though in some cases the parties have arrived at col-
lective agreements by branches or sectors).
Another, less important, difference is that in
Brazil the authorities do not lay down any compul-
sory forms of distribution among the workers, pre-
cisely in order to give greater freedom to companies
that choose the system of participation in the operat-
ing results. For example, if the results obtained by a
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8 For example, an ECLAC study reports on a number of cases of
participative wage systems in large Chilean firms where the
variable proportion of wages is a significant percentage of total
remuneration. The same study also includes some examples of
Brazilian companies that were already applying such participa-
tion programmes even before the adoption of Provisional














up to 2 or 4
months’ wages)
work group are taken as the reference value and it is
desired to promote solidarity among the members of
the group, the employers may prefer to make equal
payments to all the workers in the group. If, how-
ever, it is desired to give priority to individual pro-
ductivity, then the most appropriate form of
distribution would depend on the wages earned by
each worker. These problems do not arise when it is
a question of sharing out the profits.
Furthermore, the Brazilian system only ex-
pressly excludes non-profit-making institutions, so
that it may be described as a universal system. As
Provisional Measure 794 lays down that all firms
must negotiate the participation of their workers, ei-
ther in profits or in the operating results, this mea-
sure can cover the most diverse types of companies
–smaller, bigger; newer, older; with greater or
smaller market shares; with greater or smaller prof-
its– because in each case the company’s special fea-
tures will be taken into account.
This latter aspect is probably the most distinctive
feature of the Brazilian system: it emphasizes the
need for negotiation between the parties, whereas the
other systems lay down a very clear form of calcula-
tion and application which does not allow for much
discussion. In this respect, there is a very marked dif-
ference from the Chilean system, where the choice
between giving workers a share in a percentage of
the profits or making limited payments based on the
workers’ wages is entirely up to the employer, who
will normally choose the option which is cheapest
for his firm.
IV
Appraisal of a “pure” profit-sharing
system: the Mexican system
Like any other legal instrument, profit-sharing sys-
tems can only be assessed on the basis of the way
they actually operate. In the following paragraphs,
details will be given of some of the criteria used in
1996 in Mexico by a tripartite commission responsi-
ble for reviewing the percentage share of workers in
the profits of their firms (PSP).9 In Mexico, a com-
mission must meet every 10 years for the sole pur-
pose of adjusting that percentage, to which end a
secretariat is set up which prepares studies based on
existing or specially collected data and analyses the
answers of the social actors to questionnaires de-
signed to find out the views of workers and employ-
ers. The purpose of the commission seems rather
limited, as it cannot suggest changes or improve-
ments in the legislation or its forms of application.
At all events, the criteria used by the commission can
provide background information and serve as food
for thought.
According to data from the Ministry of Finance
on taxable profits and the share of workers in the
proportion to be distributed, although the law lays
down that at least 10% of the profits must be distrib-
uted, this percentage was never attained in the 1990s.
The year which came closest was 1990, when 8.2%
of the profits was distributed (figure 2).
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9 The information given in this section is based on the records of
the commission in question.
FIGURE 2
Mexico: Workers’ shares in profits, 1990-1994
(As a percentage of taxable profits)
Part of the difference between the percentage
laid down by law and the share actually distributed is
due to accounting discrepancies between the base
used for determining income tax payments, which is
adjusted for inflation, and the base for determining
workers’ participation, which is not so adjusted. An-
other part of the difference is due to under-estimation
of the PSP. This appears to show that, in practice, the
minimum amount of 10% of profits is not being dis-
tributed.
Data from the Institute of Statistics show that the
profits for distribution differ greatly from one sector
of the economy to another. Most of the PSP in
Mexico has always been distributed in the industrial
sector: 69% of the total in 1993 and 64% in 1995. In
commerce, the PSP went down appreciably between
those years, sinking from 24% to 17% of the total,
while in the services sector it went up slightly (from
12% to 15%).
However, this information is not really the most
appropriate, as the industrial sector is also the big-
gest formal-sector employer. A more appropriate in-
dicator would therefore be the profits distributed per
employed worker, that is to say, per worker in the
formal segment which is obliged to report company
profits. In 1994 the number of workers in this situa-
tion was 10.7 million, out of an economically active
population of a little over 35 million.
The industrial sector has always distributed a
larger amount per employed worker than the other
sectors of the economy (table 1), and in recent years
this difference has been increasing: in 1985 the
amount in pesos distributed in industry was 1.5 times
greater than that distributed in commerce, but in
1993 it was 3.5 times greater. There was also a trend
towards convergence between commerce and ser-
vices, basically because of the decline in the amount
of profits distributed per worker in the commercial
sector.
What percentage of total remuneration in each
sector do the amounts of profits distributed among
the workers represent? To take an example, in 1985
the amount distributed per worker in industry was
690 pesos (50% more than in commerce and 2.4
times as much as in services). As a percentage of the
total remuneration of the workers in each of these
sectors, however, the relative size of the amount dis-
tributed under profit-sharing in industry was less
than in commerce and almost the same as in services,
simply because the average wage in industry was
much higher than in the other two sectors.
In order to evaluate the real impact of a system
of participation in profits or operating results, how-
ever, it is important not only to know the amount of
profits distributed per employed worker, but also to
know what proportion they represent of total remu-
neration or of the basic wage. In 1993, for example,
although the amount distributed per worker in com-
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 9 • D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 976
WORKER PARTICIPATION IN COMPANY PROFITS OR OPERATING RESULTS IN LATIN AMERICA • ANDRÉS E. MARINAKIS
TABLE 1
Mexico: Profits distributed per worker
(In 1994 pesos)
Sectors 1985 1988 1993
Industry 690.2 812.2 713.1
Commerce 463.2 349.9 204.1
Services 293.0 211.9 207.2
Industry/commerce 1.5 2.3 3.5
Industry/services 2.4 3.8 3.4
Source: Mexico, Government (1996).
TABLE 3
Mexico: Workers’ shares in profits, as a
proportion of total remuneration
(Percentages)
Industry 1984 1988 1991
Manufacturing 2.6 5.4 4.9
Foodstuffs 3.5 5.5 5.2
Textiles 2.6 2.6 1.6
Paper 2.6 9.0 7.8
Chemicals and petroleum
products 4.3 8.0 6.2
Basic metals 1.1 3.1 3.4
Wood 1.3 2.1 2.8
Source: Mexico, Government (1996).
TABLE 2
Mexico: Workers’ shares in profits, as a
proportion of total remuneration
(Percentages)
Sector 1985 1988 1993
Industry 2.8 4.0 3.2
Commerce 4.2 4.3 2.1
Services 2.4 2.3 1.5
Total, nationwide 3.0 3.8 2.5
Source: Mexico, Government (1996).
merce was practically the same as in services, the
proportion of total remuneration distributed in this
way was greater in commerce, where it represented
2.1% of total remuneration (table 2).
The percentages given in that table, which range
from 1.5% to 4%, give the impression that the pro-
portion distributed is very low. It should be noted,
however, that on the one hand these average figures
conceal great differences within each sector, industry
or company: in manufacturing, for example, workers
in the food products and chemicals branches received
a larger amount in profit-sharing than the average for
industry in the three years studied, while the amounts
received by workers in the wood and textile indus-
tries were below the average (table 3). On the other
hand, the average figures were depressed by the in-
clusion of workers who received little or nothing un-
der profit-sharing because their companies did not
make a profit. In view of this, the amounts distrib-
uted by companies which did make a profit in such
branches as foodstuffs, paper, chemical products and
petroleum products may be considered as significant,
since they are estimated to come to over 10% of an-
nual remuneration.
V
A preliminary appraisal of the
Brazilian system
Although Provisional Measure No. 794 is not the de-
finitive law, it has been applied for the last five
years. There is therefore some practical experience
of worker participation in profits and operating re-
sults which allows us to make a preliminary ap-
praisal of the positive and negative aspects of the
measure and the effectiveness of its provisions.
In order to make a proper appraisal of the Bra-
zilian system it is necessary first of all to know how
far employers have complied with the few compul-
sory provisions of this measure, for which purpose
we need macroeconomic information on the situation
and, to a lesser extent, information on what happens
within the firms themselves.
Secondly, we need to know what happens with
the aspects which are open to negotiation and
whether the results are in line with those desired by
the legislators, trade unions, employers and authori-
ties. Although some aggregate data can be used for
this purpose, what we really need to know is what
happens at the company level.
1. Fulfillment of compulsory provisions
In order to determine the degree of fulfillment of
these provisions it is important to know the number
of companies (and the number of workers) which
have successfully negotiated arrangements for shar-
ing in profits or operating results; the number of
companies where negotiations have not reached a
successful conclusion (and, among these companies,
the number where the process is under mediation and
arbitration), and the number of companies which
have not yet negotiated these matters.
This information, when compared with the po-
tential universe, will show if the requirement for ne-
gotiation laid down in article 2 of the Provisional
Measure is being fulfilled or not.10 This is particu-
larly important because the Provisional Measure
does not lay down time limits for the negotiations or
penalties if one of the parties refuses to negotiate. On
the basis of this information, we can determine if
these problems occur in particular in some specific
regions, in some sector of the economy, or in some
particular type of enterprise, classified according to
size, for example.
Unfortunately, so far there is no source which
processes all the agreements signed, but it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the application of arrange-
ments for participation in profits or operating results
is still very limited outside the large and me-
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10 For the purposes of the Provisional Measure, physical per-
sons and non-profit-making institutions (the only exceptions
from the requirement for negotiations between the company and
its workers) are not considered to be equivalent to “enterprises”.
dium-sized manufacturing enterprises of Southeast
Brazil.
Another compulsory provision refers to the fre-
quency of payment of the workers’ shares. In this re-
spect, the Provisional Measure lays down a
minimum period of six months. We need to see
whether this minimum frequency is being observed
or if annual distribution is preferred, and we also
need to see whether distribution is concentrated in
some particular time of year, which could have some
economic significance because of its effect on con-
sumption.
In the case of Brazil, right from the start the au-
thorities were concerned to ensure that payments in
respect of participation in profits or operating results
were not used to avoid making payments that should
form part of the basic wage (thus taking advantage of
the exemption from social welfare contributions). In
the Provisional Measure this concern was reflected in
the establishment of a minimum period of six months
between payments of workers’ shares, on the as-
sumption that it would not be possible to postpone
the payment of sums corresponding to the basic
wage for so long. Within the broad liberty of negotia-
tion laid down in the Provisional Measure, this re-
quirement is one of the few that is compulsory.
However, analysis of some of the agreements on
participation in profits or operating results reveals
that this provision is not being complied with in all
cases, as some agreements provide for frequencies of
less than six months. According to a study made by
the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and
Socio-Economic Studies (DIEESE), based on 448
agreements signed in 1996, 6% of them provided for
payment three times a year, and 2% provided for
more than three such payments (DIEESE, 1996). In a
non-systematic review of agreements for participa-
tion in profits or operating results, Professor Hélio
Zylberstajn found that nearly 20% of them had distri-
bution frequencies of less than six months (22% in
1995 and 17% in 1996).11 Furthermore, it is not un-
usual to give advances in respect of such participa-
tion, which is equivalent to more frequent payments
than those provided for in PM 794. If this practice
were to become general it would undermine the fi-
nancing of social services as well as reducing the
role of wages proper in the economy, thus weaken-
ing the fiscal position12 and distorting wage struc-
tures.
It would therefore appear that this is one of the
aspects that should be carefully monitored as long as
this provision remains in force. Another option
would be to establish a maximum limit (as a percent-
age of the basic wage) for the amount eligible for ex-
emption from the payment of social welfare and
social security charges, while leaving the frequency
of distribution of workers’ shares in profits or operat-
ing results to be negotiated in each firm.
Nor is information available on the possible
impact of concentration of workers’ participation
payments in some particular period of the year.
According to the DIEESE sample, in 1996 some 750
million reales were distributed under this concept.
These figures show that, if worker participation
arrangements spread, the amount distributed in this
way could be such as to represent an important factor
at the macroeconomic level.
2. Negotiations in Brazil
Since in Brazil the adoption of programmes for
worker participation in profits or operating results is
subject to negotiation between the parties, it would
be of interest to know who actually carries out the
negotiations. To begin with, the Provisional Measure
left the representation of the workers in the negotiat-
ing process to a worker committee elected for this
purpose. Only recently have the trade unions been
given a role in this process, through the amendment
made to PM 794 in August 1997.13 Despite this gap in
the legislation, it is worth noting that in most cases
the negotiations which have taken place have in fact
included the trade unions. Furthermore, in a number
of cases it was the trade unions which promoted the
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11 This information was presented by Professor Zylberstajn at
the seminar on experience in worker participation in company
profits or operating results, held at São Paulo on 14 August
1997. The references to “Zylberstajn” made below refer to his
statements at that seminar.
12 This assertion is all the more serious because the companies
which apply programmes of worker participation in their profits
or operating results are generally large manufacturing enter-
prises which are also among the largest taxpayers. If this group
of firms reduces its contributions, the fiscal impact could be
very severe.
13
“Participation in profits or operating results shall be subject
to negotiation between the company and its employees, through
a committee elected by the latter and also including a represen-
tative designated by the trade union for the respective category
of activities” (article 2).
holding of negotiations on worker participation,
sometimes even calling strikes for this reason.
Zylberstajn found that in the agreements signed
in 1996 the party negotiating with the employers was
the trade union in 29% of the cases and the trade un-
ion in conjunction with the workers’ committee in
34% (figure 3). Thus, the workers’ committees nego-
tiated and signed the agreements on behalf of the
staff in only one-third of the cases analysed.
It would also be desirable to find out what crite-
rion was adopted by the parties to the negotiation:
participation in the profits or operating results (and
which of these was preferred), or simply the distribu-
tion of a fixed amount as the workers’ participation,
although this amount was not linked in any way with
the company’s profits or the achievement of any spe-
cific results. Although this latter option is not among
those envisaged in the Provisional Measure (and
moreover is not in keeping with the spirit of that
legislation), it may nevertheless be the result of the
negotiations between the parties in a company or
sector.
The aim of collecting this information is to gain
an idea of the possible impact of these forms of par-
ticipation on the economy. If profits are selected as
the main criterion, this places more emphasis on the
idea of distribution, and the workers’ share will de-
pend on the financial performance of the company. If
it is decided to base payment on the operating re-
sults, this will probably represent an effort to change
some forms of behaviour and thus support the intro-
duction of improvements. Finally, if it is decided to
share out a fixed amount simply in order to comply
with the Provisional Measure, without taking the
trouble to prepare a programme of objectives, this
will merely increase labour costs without the com-
pany obtaining anything in particular in return: it
does not provide support for changes or desired im-
provements, nor does it bring the greater flexibility
offered by a variable component such as participa-
tion linked to company profits. Consequently, out of
the three alternatives only that based on operating re-
sults can have ongoing effects, as the parameters can
be replaced or adjusted over time, thus further im-
proving the working performance and hence the
competitiveness of the company. In contrast, the ef-
fects of systems based on company profits or a fixed
payment will mainly be felt at the macroeconomic
level when they are introduced, through an increase
in consumption, but they will not improve the com-
petitiveness of the company.
When the Provisional Measure was adopted,
employers tended to view worker participation in
company profits or operating results as an extra la-
bour cost. There was also a general lack of knowl-
edge of what factors could be considered as
operating results and how they could be used, so that
the potential of this instrument as a management tool
was not clearly perceived. Furthermore, it was as-
sumed that once the concept of payment in respect of
participation in profits or operating results had been
accepted, these amounts would have to be main-
tained as bases in subsequent financial years, which
is not so, because they represent a variable compo-
nent of remuneration. The list of doubts would not be
complete without mentioning the mutual mistrust be-
tween the parties regarding access to information
considered to be a business secret (on the employers’
side) and regarding the quality of the information
provided (especially in the case of financial informa-
tion), on the part of the workers and unions.
What was clear from the beginning, however,
was that payments in respect of participation in com-
pany profits or operating results would be exempt
from social security contributions. This was a factor
which encouraged employers to adopt the first
programmes of this type. In the first stage, worker
participation in profits or operating results was ap-
plied in the most highly unionized companies or sec-
tors, and in most cases payments under this concept
consisted of fixed sums bearing no relation to com-
pany profits or the achievement of some agreed re-
sult. Although this form of application is not in
keeping with the spirit of PM 794, it is considered
valid because it is the result of negotiations between
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FIGURE 3
Brazil: Representation of workers in negotiations, 1996
the parties. According to a sample taken by the
DIEESE, only 12.6% of the agreements analysed in-
cluded some kind of targets (DIEESE, 1996).
In a second stage, progress was made towards
negotiations based on the establishment of targets,
with corresponding scales of rewards. In his study,
Zylberstajn found that there was a reduction in the
number of agreements not subject to the achievement
of objectives.14 It can therefore be considered that
the use of the worker participation instrument has
made progress in qualitative terms, because it is now
an element that can help to raise the companies’ level
and there is now “genuine financing” of the pay-
ments made in respect of participation in profits or
operating results.
In a third stage, we need to determine the
amounts distributed as a percentage of the total re-
muneration of the workers in question, in order to
see whether there are major differences between
companies of different sectors or sizes and to see if
this new component of remuneration is gaining in
importance or if it is greater than the “desirable”
level.
On average, the size of the payments made in re-
spect of worker participation in profits or operating
results is very significant compared with the basic
wage. A survey made by the Mercer MW consultancy
firm, focussed on large domestic or foreign-owned
enterprises, found that on average payments under
this concept in 1996 were equivalent to 1.16 wages
per worker, while payments by companies that gave
a fixed amount averaged almost 1,000 reales (ap-
proximately US$ 1,000). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the size of payments for worker
participation in profits or operating results depends
partly on the size of the company (figure 4). The
DIEESE sample, which covers a broader range of
companies than the Mercer survey, shows this very
clearly.
On the one hand, the fact that the payments
made are quite large is a positive element, as it
means they constitute a genuine incentive for the
workers. On the other hand, however, it may indicate
that in some cases payments which ought to form
part of the basic wage are being diverted to workers’




What are the aspects of systems for worker participa-
tion in profits or operating results that are best
adapted to the economic context in which companies
operate, and what are their shortcomings? With re-
gard to “pure” profit-sharing systems, the aspect best
adapted to the new demands of the economy is the
downward flexibility of labour costs, which fits in
well with short-term “defensive” strategies.15 When
there is a fall in demand which affects their profits,
the first reaction of firms is to adjust their costs, and
in this case the profit-sharing component adjusts au-
tomatically.
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FIGURE 4
Brazil: Profit sharing or participation in
operating results, by size of enterprise
Number of employees
> 500 R$              201-500 R$              101-200 R$              < 100 R$
14 This study did not cover the same group of companies in both
the years analysed, so the trends identified are only an approxi-
mation to what actually occurred.
15 Such flexibility is not displayed by, for example, the system
used in Venezuela, where there is a minimum “floor” level for
such payments, which have been converted in practice into
fixed bonuses.






The flexibility offered by systems of worker
participation in operating results, for its part, does
not strictly come from a reduction in absolute costs
(although it can result in a reduction in unit costs),
but can take other forms. Thus, for example, a
programme which improves product quality has an
indirect impact on production costs by avoiding
the need to remake parts, reducing returns of un-
satisfactory goods, reducing customer complaints,
etc. As the forms assumed by the programme will
be adapted to the particular strategic needs of the
firm, it is not a defensive approach but rather a me-
dium- and long-term strategy.
How far do these different approaches fit in
with the new realities of the international context?
Although a defensive approach may be important
at times of crisis, the demands for greater interna-
tional competitiveness faced by all firms mean that
a strategic approach is more important in the long
run. In this sense, worker participation in the oper-
ating results can be a suitable instrument for
speeding up the necessary restructuring in many
enterprises, as it makes it possible to combine the
achievement of a strategic goal of the enterprise
with the incentive to the workers needed in order
to attain that objective.
However, the difficulties involved in these
programmes must not be under-estimated. It is
more difficult to identify the bottlenecks in a firm
and find ways of solving them than to merely ap-
ply an automatic system of partial cost reductions
at times of crisis. Systems of worker participation
in operating results are quite complex. The greatest
care must be taken both in identifying the factor to
be remunerated and in establishing the measure-
ment/assessment parameters, the forms of sharing
the rewards among the workers, and the manner of
implementation. These are generally long pro-
cesses, and they must be followed up very care-
fully.
In view of this, the profit-sharing systems im-
posed by law in Latin America have clear advantages
in terms of simplicity. Their compulsory nature and
the general application of a single sharing coefficient
make their application an extremely simple process.
However, it has been seen that in practice the re-
quirements laid down in the legislation are not al-
ways complied with in full, and this sheds some
doubt on the effectiveness of these systems as in-
come distribution mechanisms.
Furthermore, the application of a single
profit-sharing coefficient for companies of very
different types does not seem to be a sufficiently
flexible approach. For example, distributing 10%
of the profits under participation arrangements is
not the same for a company which dominates its
market as it is for a firm which operates in an at-
omized market, nor is it the same for a company
which is in the first stages of growth as it is for one
which is already consolidated in its sector. The im-
possibility of adapting this system to the actual sit-
uation of each enterprise severely limits its use as
an incentive system, as it is more like an estab-
lished right of the workers.
What type of company could derive most benefit
from the application of a programme based on partic-
ipation in the operating results? Many large compa-
nies and regional transnationals are already applying
some form of participation in the operating results,
even though the national legislation does not pro-
mote such systems, and are using these programmes
as means of improving management and labour rela-
tions. This type of system continues to be little used
by medium-sized and small enterprises, however.
The introduction of legislation to promote the volun-
tary adoption of systems of participation in the oper-
ating results (for example, by offering some fiscal
benefits) could help to spread this type of
programme.
It should not be thought that the mere fact of
promoting participation in the operating results will
lead to the adoption of systems aimed at securing im-
provements. The experience of Brazil shows that, in
view of the difficulty of applying systems based on
results, many companies began to distribute extra
payments in the form of bonuses which are not, how-
ever, conditional on the achievement of any particu-
lar result. However, this initial attitude has gradually
been changing as companies have gained a better un-
derstanding of the potential of participation systems.
We can thus see that this is not an instrument which
can be expected to work perfectly as soon as it is ap-
plied, but rather a system whose effective application
requires a learning period.
Systems of participation in profits and in operat-
ing results also differ in terms of labour relations and
human resources policies. Profit-sharing systems do
not require much involvement of the workers or trade
unions. In the case of programmes designed at the
company level, such involvement may be limited to
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the negotiation of the percentage share, the form of
distribution and other similar aspects, for which pur-
pose a limited degree of representation of the work-
ers will suffice. In the systems that predominate in
Latin America, where the legislation lays down the
profit-sharing conditions, worker involvement is vir-
tually non-existent, or is limited to checking on the
fulfillment of those conditions. This form of regula-
tion seems typical of a paternalistic view on the part
of the State.
Systems of worker participation in the operating
results, in contrast, call for the direct involvement of
the workers themselves and of the trade unions in
various aspects of the process (from identification of
the strategic variables to follow-up of their applica-
tion). In this sense, the provisions of the Brazilian
Provisional Measure are appropriate, since they require
the parties to negotiate and agree upon the most suit-
able programme for each particular case. The essential
need for a dialogue between the parties and transpar-
ency of the process make these programmes a valuable
means of establishing more participative human re-
sources policies and less conflictive labour relations,
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